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I.

Introduction
The United States legislature has historically favored punitive
legislative proposals to addressing problem drug use.' However, in
addressing the current opioid crisis, legislators have been critical of
past punitive approaches, 2 such as arguing that "we cannot arrest
our way out of this problem." 3 Federal legislation enacted to address
the opioid crisis evidences that legislators are willing to act on this
rhetorical shift away from punitive approaches and have done so in
a bipartisan manner. Such a shift in legislative approaches is often
preceded by a change in the problem definition, causal theories
and aligning proposals supported by administrative agencies and
organized interest groups.'
The rhetoric supporting recent federal legislation has
evidenced an increasing acceptance of the ideas that addiction is a
disease and that the opioid crisis is a public health issue.' Addiction
has been compared to other chronic health conditions, which
require long-term maintenance, but the comparison has often not
1
2

3
4

5

6

See generally Taleed El-Sabawi, Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure
Groups, and Problem Definition. 48 U. MEM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
See, e.g., Mike Lee, We Can Beat the opioid Epidemic, MIKE LEE U.S. SENATOR
UTAH
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm/2018/5/we-can-beat-the-opioid-epidemic.
Id.
See, e.g., Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA), Pub. L.
No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695 (2016); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). CARA is bipartisan legislation that was passed
with a 94-1 vote in the Senate and a 400-5 vote in the House. 162 CONG.
REC. S1404 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2016); 162 CONG. REc. H2373 (daily ed.
May 13, 2016). CARA includes funding for education, treatment, prescriber
training, overdose reversal medication, and prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs)-policy solutions that facially appear more aligned with a
health approach. The 21st Century Cures Act built on CARA by providing an
additional $1 billion of funding over two years. 21st Century Cures Act.
Causal theories are the stated thories of causation of a social problem and are
components of causal stories. See DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX:
THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISIONS MAKING 206-07 (3d ed. 2012). See
generally El-Sabawi, supra note 1 (providing historic examples of how changes
in problem definitions have historically preceded changes in legislative
approaches in drug policy).
See, e.g., Portman, Whitehouse, Ayotte, Klobuchar CheerFinalPassageof Comprehensive
Addiction and Recovery Act, ROB

7

PORTMAN U.S. SENATOR FOR OHIO

(July 13,

2016) [hereinafter Portman], http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm/20 1 6/7/portman-whitehouse-ayotte-klobuchar-cheer-final-passage-ofcomprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act.
Drug Abuse and Addiction: One ofAmerica's Most ChallengingPublicHealth Problems
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extended to the social determinants of chronic conditions.' As such,
federal legislation, like the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery
Act of 2016 (CARA) and the 21st Century Cures Act, does not fully
embrace model drug policy' or evidence a substantive attempt to
address the psychological-sociological-economic (PSE) factors that
contribute to problem drug use. 10
Since organized interest groups and federal administrative
agencies have historically been influential in defining problem drug
use during nationwide crisis,"1 it stands to reason that the manner
in which these pressure groups defined the problem may have
influenced or, at least, provided support for legislators' decisions to
shy away from a criminal justice approach. These pressure groups1 2
may have also affected legislators' decisions to resort to a "health"
approach that did not comprehensively address demand factors or
demonstrate a commitment to reforming U.S. drug policy to meet
international standards of best practice.13 To date, little scholarly
analysis has been conducted on the involvement of organized
interests and federal administrative agencies in defining the causes
of the opioid crisis and the preferred legislative solutions.
In an effort to provide a snapshot of what such involvement
-Addiction is a ChronicDisease,NAT'L INST. DRUG ABUSE (June2005), https://

8
9

archives.drugabuse.gov/publications/drug-abuse-addiction-one-americasmost-challenging-public-health-problems/addiction-chronic-disease.
See, e.g., Portman, supra note 6.
See

TAMYKO YSA

10

11
12

13

ET AL.,

GOVERNANCE

OF ADDICTIONS:

EUROPEAN

47-48 (2014) (comparing European policies and
identifying best practices).
See supranote 4, and accompanying text.
See generally DAVID F. MUSTo, AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF
NARCOTIC CONTROL (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1999) (1973). See also ElSabawi, supra note 1.
For the purposes of this paper, I have defined pressure groups to include all
groups that place pressure on legislators to vote for an issue in a specified
manner. My definition therefore includes both organized interest groups
outside of the government and administrative officials within the government.
See ALICE RAP SCIENCE FINDINGS #1-5, #40-51, ALICE RAP (n.d.)
[hereinafter ALICE RAP FINDINGS], https://www.alicerap.eu/resources/
documents/docdownload/3 87-alice-rap-science-findings-full-document55-findings.html. ALICE RAP was a research collaboration by 200 scientists
from 25 countries and more than 29 disciplines aimed at compiling evidence
to inform European drug policy. About ALICE RAP: The Project and Results,
ALICE RAP, https://www.alicerap.eu/about-alice-rap.html#a-governance-ofaddictions (last visited Mar. 28, 2018). The researchers also analyzed existing
drug policies in European countries and provided suggestions for how to
implement best practices. See generally ALICE RAP FINDINGS, supra note 13.
PUBLIC

POLICIES

376

El-Sabawi

may look like, this article explores the types of narratives used by
pressure groups to define the opioid crisis in the congressional
hearing discourse prior to the enactment of CARA. In order to do
this, I analyzed 144 congressional hearing testimonies1 4 discussing
the opioid crisis and identified the most common narratives used to
explain the causes of the opioid crisis." I also identified the types of
legislative proposals supported in these narratives.
Understanding the narratives used by organized interests
and federal administrative agencies to define the opioid crisis offers
some insight as to the narratives that were used to justify the
inclusion of the provisions enacted in CARA, as narratives can be
used to narrow down the available alternative legislative solutions.
Organized interest groups offer the opportunity for citizens, including
invested professionals, researchers, and individuals suffering from a
substance use disorder, to engage in the problem definition process
and influence the types of legislative proposals enacted. Gaining a
better understanding of how organized interests have contributed or
shaped the legislative problem definition discourse will better equip
activated citizens to navigate the pluralist discourse and advocate for
significant change.
14

15

The corpus, or population, of documents that were analyzed were compiled
by conducting a search on Thomas Reuters Westlaw for congressional hearing
testimony using the search terms "addict!" and "overdose!" and limiting the
dates to hearings occurring in January 2014 to June 2016. I chose to limit the
analysis to hearings occurring within these dates because it would capture the
discourse that preceded CARA, which was passed in June 2016. I restricted
the dataset to 2014 because of resource constraints. Future research will be
needed to determine whether the findings of this article are time-limited.
The terms addict! and overdose! were chosen because the purpose of my
analysis is to capture the discourse on the social problem commonly referred
to as the opioid crisis. It has been characterized by rates in overdose and an
acknowledgment of the problem of addiction. I then excluded testimony, or
parts of testimony, that discussed methamphetamine use, synthetic drug use,
and marijuana use, as these problems were characterized differently than the
opioid crisis, a difference I hope to capture in a future analysis. The results
were then limited to hearings that occurred from 2014 to 2016. Both written
and oral testimony were included.
To analyze the congressional hearing testimony, I used both qualitative and
quantitative text analysis. I used QDAMiner5 for the qualitative coding and
Wordstat7 for the quantitative analysis. I used content analysis methodology to
create categories of causal stories and proposed solutions. Once the categories
were saturated, meaning causal stories I identified fit into the categories
created and no additional categories needed to be created, I identified patterns
and broader themes evidenced by the categories.
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I begin Part II with a discussion of how organized interest
groups and federal administrative agencies are theorized to influence
legislators, with a short overview of the problem definition and the
role of causal stories-a type of policy narrative-in the problem
definition process. In Part III, I discuss the types of causal stories
that I identified in my analysis of congressional hearing testimony,
contrasting these narratives with narratives that were used in the past
to support criminal justice legislative approaches. Part IV concludes
with suggestions on how pressure groups can utilize this political
window of opportunity"6 to shift the narrative discourse from policy
narratives based on causal theories of supply to causal theories that
acknowledge the sociological, biological, environmental, behavioral,
psychological, and economic causes of problem drug use.
II. Theories of Pressure Group Influence
Although for much of this article, I refer to organized interest
groups and federal administrative agencies collectively as pressure
groups, the literature analyzing their influence on legislative behavior
is distinct so I review each separately.
A. Empirical Evidence of Pressure Groups' Influence on
Federal Legislators
Although organized interest groups are thought to influence
federal legislators through their campaign contributions, little
empirical evidence exists supporting the contention that money buys
groups their preferred legislative outcomes.1 7 Since organized interest
groups continue to spend millions of dollars funding campaigns,
they must believe that the money spent is buying them something
of importance. If campaign contributions are not buying legislative
outcomes, they may be buying legislators' time. Investigators have
16

I am using "political window of opportunity" here to refer to a phenomenum
that is originally described by Dr. John Kingdon as a "policy window," which
occurs when three streams meet: the problem stream, the policy stream, and
the politics stream. See JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND
PUBLIC POLICIES 165-66 (2d ed. 1995).

17

See Beth L. Leech, Lobbying and Influence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST

GROUPS 534-51 (L. Sandy

Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010) for a review of the literature. However,
there is literature that shows that groups may contribute to legislators that
are on powerful committees. See, e.g., Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer,

Money in Exile: Campaign Contributionsand Committee Access, 78
(2016).

J. POL.

974, 976
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found that legislators are more likely to meet with groups that
contribute to their campaigns." So, although organized interest
groups may not be buying votes, they may be buying legislator time
and attention."9
Organized interest groups can use this time to define social
problems using causal stories that best align with their desired
outcomes. 2 0 Legislators are inclined to listen to organized interest
groups, even if the groups have not contributed large sums of
money to their campaigns, because interest groups may be privy to
specialized, subject-matter-specific information .21 This information
provides legislators with policy-specific information that they can
use to make informed decisions and support their positions. These
interest groups subsidize the legislators' costs of acquiring this
information, costs that can include time and resources.22 Meanwhile,
these groups can use their privileged position to define the problem
advantageously.
B. Federal AdministrativeAgencies as Narrators in U.S. Drug
Policy
The idea that organized interest groups use causal narratives
to sway legislators may seem more intuitive or believable than the
use of causal narratives by federal administrative agency officials
to do the same. However, historically, in the U.S., high ranking
officials in federal administrative agencies have been dominant
18

19
20

21
22

Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign ContributionsFacilitateAccess
to CongressionalOfficials: A Randomized FieldExperiment, 60 AM. J. POL. Scl. 545,
passim (2016).
See id. at 545.
These outcomes of interest may not necessarily be legislative outcomes. An
organized interest group may be interested in changing the dominant problem
definition, in and of itself. For example, a group of persons recovering from
addiction may be invested in the adoption of the "addiction as a disease
narrative"-a narrative that attributes the cause of addiction to a brain disease.
Regardless of the legislative outcome, the adoption of such a narrative is a
victory in and of itself, as it helps destigmatize addiction by treating it as an
illness instead of a moral failing.
Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM.
POL. Scl. REV. 69, 74 (2006).
Id. at 72, 74. In general, citizens' groups' reports are given more credibility
than industry reports. See JEFFREY M.

BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE

RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS 127-29

(1999);

WILLIAM

P. BROWNE,

CULTIVATING CONGRESS: CONSTITUENTS, ISSUES, AND INTERESTS IN
AGRICULTURAL POLICYMAKING 241

(1995).
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players in the problem definition of drug use. 23 The causal narratives
crafted by these agencies, often using data collected by the agencies,
supported legislative action that limited alternative legislative
solutions to those that utilized existing institutional structures. As
such, these solutions were easiest to implement, unlike solutions
that require multimodal approaches, agency collaboration, and
the strengthening of the welfare state-even if such a multimodal
approach was empirically the most successful model for combatting
addiction and overdose crises.2 4 These officials and the agencies that
they oversee have influenced the problem definition discourse in a
number of ways, including by using their positions as subject matter
experts, implementers, and enforcers of legislation to increase the
credibility of their definition of the problem when testifying in front
of Congress. 25 As such, these agencies participate in the problem
definition discourse along with organized interest groups and
they may even influence the types of causal theories supported by
organized interest groups.
In sum, administrative agencies influence the problem
definition discourse by contributing scientific information that
supports their causal story and providing accompanying rhetoric.
These agencies have historically influenced the problem definition
discourse, and in doing so, affected the types of legislative solutions
proposed and enacted in U.S. drug policy. 26 The causal stories used
by the agencies to describe the causes of drug problems have been
supply-side, focusing on the availability of drugs as the cause for
use, with the lack of access to drug abuse treatment coming at a
distant second.2 7 The legislative solution enacted to address the
nation's current drug problem is a primarily health-oriented piece

24

25
26
27

See generally DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF
OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA (enl. ed. 2001) (1982); MUSTO, supranote
11. See generally FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY
AND PRACTICE (Jonathan Erlen & Joseph T. Spillane eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Erlen & Spillane].
For support for this argument, compare COURTWRIGHT supra note 23,
MUSTO, supra note 11, and ERLEN & SPILLANE, supra note 23, with ALICE
RAP FINDINGS, supranote 13.
See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 23; MUSTO, supra note 11; Erlen
Spillane, supranote 23.
See generally Erlen & Spillane, supra note 23; COURTWRIGHT, supra note 23;
MUSTO, supra note 11.
Federal administrative agencies have been historically incentivized to support
supply-side policies that are criminal justice oriented. See El-Sabawi, supra
note 1. See generally Erlen & Spillane, supranote 23; MUSTO, supra note 11.
&

23
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of legislation, and suggests that the causal stories used by federal
administrative agencies were more health- or medically-oriented.
III. Causal Stories, Pressure Groups, Congress, and the Opioid
Crisis
A. Types of Causal Stories Used by Pressure Groups in
Congressional Hearings
In order to get at least a partial view of the types of causal
stories used by pressure groups to convince Congress of the causes
of the opioid crisis, I reviewed a sample of federal congressional
hearing testimony on substance abuse and overdoses between 2014
and 2016. I chose this time period because it preceded the enactment
of CARA.
The first trend I noticed was that some narratives included
an explicit reference to a cause of the problem (explicit causal
theory), while others implicitly suggested the cause by supporting a
particular solution (implicit causal theory). Implicit causal theories
allowed the narrators to support a causal theory that aligned with a
policy solution, without having to explicitly blame certain actors for
causing the crisis. Even when explicit narratives were used, pressure
groups demonstrated a preference for explicitly blaming groups.
The second major trend I identified was that the criminal
justice theme that dominated problem definitions in past drug crises 28
has been overtaken by a health theme that included attributing
the causes of addiction to a disease and calling for health actors to
be involved in addressing the crisis. Despite the prevalence of the
health theme, however, the idea that drug supply caused addiction
and overdoses was still ever-present. 29 Finally, only a select few
testifiers acknowledged PSE factors3 0 as causes of drug use, despite
the empirical literature supporting their likely contribution and the
emphasis placed on these causes in other developed nations.31
28

See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 23.

29
30

This idea will be discussed in detail in Section III(A) (2) (a), infra.
In saying psycho-social-economic factors, I am also referencing ideas of despair
or lack of hope as factors that contribute to drug use and overdoses. For an
overview of the despair hypothesis, see Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality
and Morbidity in the 21st Century, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY
397, 397-98, 408, 417, 420, 427 (2017). See also CARL L. HART, HIGH PRICE:
DRUGS, NEUROSCIENCE AND DISCOVERING MYSELF 8, 90-94 (Penguin
Books Ltd. 2013).
See generally Technical Reports, ALICE RAP, http://www.alicerap.eu/resources/

31
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Implicit vs. Explicit Causal Stories

a. Implicit Causal Stories
A subset of the hearing testimony that I analyzed did
not include explicit causal theories, in that the speakers did not
unequivocally state the cause of the opioid crisis, but rather, they
implied the cause through their support for a particular solution and
often through the types of statistics they chose to highlight. Such
testimony often began with a general statement of the scope of the
opioid crisis, supported by statistics, and then a call for the proposed
solution to be adopted.
For example, during one hearing, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services proposed solutions aimed at decreasing
the supply and availability of prescription opioids, including
providing support to states invested in prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs) and publishing a "best practices" for prescribing
opioids without explicitly stating that over-prescription of opioid
prescription pills was the cause of the opioid crisis.3 2 HHS implicitly
communicated that over-prescription was the cause by suggesting
solutions that were aimed at decreasing the supply of prescription
opioids.
Implicitly referencing the cause of the problem accomplishes
more than just supporting the preferred solution. Arguably, the
benefit of using such implicit causal stories is that the narrator avoids
the political consequences of explicitly blaming a group, while still
supporting the desired policy solution. For example, rather than
documents/catview/1-alice-rap-project-documents/7-reports.html
(providing reports from the ALICE RAP series project) (last visited May
22, 2018). See, e.g., ALICE RAP, DELIVERABLE 9.1: THE DETERMINANTS
OF A REDUCTION

32

IN

OR CESSATION

OF HARMFUL

SUBSTANCE

USE

(n.d.), http://www.alicerap.eu/resources/documents/
doc download/206-deliverable-09-1-determinants-of-a-reduction-inor-cessation-of-harmful-substance-use-and-gambling.html
(discussing
"the determinants of harmful substance use and gambling from across 11
disciplines within five clusters: social and cultural factors, personal factors,
patterns of usage and drug knowledge, cellular and molecular factors, and
multidisciplinary models.").
See Examining Legislative Proposals to Combat Our Nation's Drug Abuse Crisis:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
114th Cong. 26-34 (2015) (prepared statement of Richard Frank, Ph.D.,
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services), 2015 WL 6152905.
AND

GAMBLING
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directly blaming prescribers for causing the opioid crisis and risking
the political ramifications of accusing a relatively politically powerful
group of malfeasance or negligence, use of an implicit causal story
garners support for a group's preferred policy solution, without
alienating prescribers.
Implicit causal stories are strategically beneficial not only
because they help narrators avoid the political ramifications of
finger-pointing, but also because they shift the discourse away from
debating the causes of the opioid crisis to debating the efficacies of
the proposed solutions.33 The implicit cause was assumed to be the
true cause, signaling that no discussion was even needed.3 4 This kept
actors from critiquing and, perhaps, theorizing that the causes of the
opioid crisis were not only the facially obvious supply-side causal
theories that were most frequently referenced, but also included
fuzzier concepts of despair,35 lack of hope, or lack of opportunity,3 6
that were largely omitted from the pressure group discourse. Such
a strategy shifts the discourse away from debating the causes of the
opioid crisis to debating the merits of the solution. And, a simple
before-and-after measurement of drug supply would be a sufficient
measure of a solution's efficacy.
b. Explicit Causal Stories
In the congressional hearing testimony analyzed, explicit
causal stories most often took the form of narratives rooted in
intentional and inadvertent causal theories.3 7 Intentional causal
theories include causal theories that posit that the actor's action
was intentional and that the actor intended the results.3 8 Inadvertent
33
34

35
36
37

38

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. (The focus on the solutions of supply, treatment for drug users,
and harm reduction imply that the problem is the supply, lack of treatment,
and lack of harm reduction without explicitly stating it as the cause).
See generally Case & Deaton, supra note 30.
See HART, supra note 30, at 8, 90-94.
Dr. Deborah Stone argues that most causal theories used in policy narratives
involve two components: actions and consequences. STONE, supra note 5, at
208 (3d ed. 2012). Blame is assigned based on whether or not these actions
and consequences were intended (or guided) or unintended (unguided).
Id. Therefore, causal theories can include (1) unguided actions but with
intended results ("mechanical cause"), (2) guided actions with intentional
consequences ("intentional cause"), (3) guided actions with unintended
consequences ("inadvertent cause"), or (4) a result of a "complex systems."
Id. at 208, 214-15.
Intentional causes typically include an actor that acted intentionally and
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causal theories are theories of causation in which the actor may
have intended to commit the act, but did not intend the resulting
outcome.3 9
Although most testimony implicitly referred to overprescription as the cause of the problem, there were instances in
which certain actors were explicitly blamed for causing the opioid
crisis by over-prescribing prescription opioids or for causing the
over-prescription of opioids. Actors that were blamed explicitly
for over-prescription included the medical profession (in general),
pharmaceutical opioid manufacturers, drug seekers, "bad apples" in
the medical industry, and foreign drug cartels.4 0
2.

Supply-Side vs. Demand-Side Causal Narratives

Aside from the distinction between explicit and implicit
causal narratives, narratives could be further divided into supplyside and demand-side causal narratives. Supply-side causal narratives
blamed the cause of the opioid crisis on the supply of opioids, while
demand-side causal narratives attempted to explain why people
demanded drugs.
a. Supply-Side Causal Stories
The idea that the rise of overdoses and addiction in the
U.S. was caused by the increased availability of opioids was a
common feature of the congressional hearing testimony reviewed. 1

39

40
41

intentionally caused the outcome in dispute. Id. at 209. This category includes
"conspiracies," "harmful side effects that are known but ignored," "bad
apples," and "blaming the victim." Id. at 208. These narratives explicitly blame
the victim for causing the social problem that the victim is affected by. Id.
Inadvertent causal theories include "unanticipated harmful side effects of
policy," "avoidable ignorance," "carelessness," and "blaming the victim."
STONE, supra note 37. Causal theories that blame the victim within this
category are softer than the intentional causal theories outlined in note 38, as
the actions could have been well-intentioned but resulted in a poor outcome.
Id. For example, if physicians, as a profession, prescribed opioids in order to
treat pain as a fifth vital sign and ease the pain of the population, although
their prescriptions were intentional acts, they did not intend for their patients
to become addicted or overdose to the medications. See infra p. 390 and note
75.
Examples of causal stories used to assign blame will be provided in the
following sub-section.
See, e.g., Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing Before the Caucus on Int'l
Narcotics Control of the S. Comm'ns. and Temp. Comms., 113th Cong. (2014)
(statement of Nora D. Volkow, M.D., Director, National Institute on Drug
Abuse) [hereinafter NIDA 2014], 2014 WL 1990482.
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Historically, supply-side causal narratives emphasized the trafficking
of illicit psychoactive substances with blame explicitly assigned to
foreign and local criminal enterprises.4 2 The 2014-2016 supply-side
causal narratives differed from the blatant supply-side narratives of
the past because the 2014-2016 narratives involved health actors,
the health system, and health terminology. 43 For example, while street
gangs and Colombian cartels may have been blamed for supplying the
crack cocaine responsible for the crack cocaine drug crisis in the late
1980s and early 1990s, 4 4 doctors, pharmacists, pharmacies, and drug
manufacturers were often blamed for supplying the opioid crisis.
While internal systems at the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
the Drug Enforcement Administration may have been touted as the
solutions to past drug epidemics, prescription monitoring systems
were proposed to identify bad apples in the healthcare system, 4 6 as
well as to improve quality of care. The use of health or medical
terminology and actors makes the narratives used appear as if the
opioid crisis is being defined as a public health issue. However, the
causal narratives are classic supply-side narratives attributing the
cause of addiction and overdoses to availability of the substance; and
they imply that the supply must be limited because the prevalence of
the supply itself causes rises of overdose and addiction. Meanwhile,
the public health approach to drug policy has been characterized, at
least internationally, by solutions that focus on reducing the harms
42
43

44
45
46

47

For historic examples, see MUSTO, supra note 11; COURTWRIGHT, supranote
23.
By health terminology, I am referring to the characterization of addiction
or overdoses as adverse health consequences or side effects to medication,
for example. See, e.g., Opioid Abuse Among Older Americans: Hearing Before the
S. Spec. Committee on Aging, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Katherine
Neuhausen, M.D., MPH, Assistant Professor, Department of Family Medicine
and Population Health and Associate Director, Office of Health Innovation,
Virigna Commonwealth University) [hereinafter Opioid Abuse Among Older
Americans), 2016 WL 370153.
See COURTWRIGHT, supra note 23 at 180.
See, e.g., Opioid Abuse Among Older Americans, supranote 43.
See, e.g., Heroin/PrescriptionDrug Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Louis J. Milione, Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration) [hereinafter DEA 2016], 2016 WL 319839.
See VA Opioid Prescription Policy, Practice, and Procedures: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 114th Cong. 12-17 (2015) (prepared statement of
John D. Daigh, Jr., M.D., C.PA., Assistant Inspector General for Healthcare
Inspections, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs)
[hereinafter Daigh, VA OpioidPrescriptionPolicy], 2015 WL 1348883.
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of use and addressing the reasons for users' demand for the drug.
The most dominant supply-side causal narratives in the 20142016 legislative discourse can be grouped as follows: (1) narratives
that blamed the cause of the opioid crisis on over-prescription of
prescription opioids, (2) those that blamed "bad apples" for diverting
prescription opioids to the streets for financial gain, and (3) those
that blamed the opioid crisis on international supply of heroin and
synthetic drugs.
i. Over-Prescription as a Cause of the Opioid
Crisis
Variations of causal stories that attributed the cause of the
opioid crisis to physician over-prescribing included: (1) The pills
themselves were highly addictive 48 even for those that used the
prescriptions as directed;49 and (2) Opioids were over-prescribed and
left-over prescriptionss 0 were diverted to the black market or misused
by family members and friends." Some narrators explicitly blamed
physicians for over-prescribing,5 2 and others blamed "bad apples"5 3
in the medical industry, pharmacists, physicians, pharmacies, drug
manufacturers, and doctor shoppers, for diverting opioids for
financial gain. 4 Some narrators avoided blaming groups of actors
directly and, instead, spoke generally about over-prescription or
prescription drug availability as a problem. 5
48

49
50

51
52
53
54
55

See, e.g., Opioid Abuse in America: Facing the Epidemic and Examining Solutions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 114th Cong.
25-27 (2015) (prepared statement of Eric Spofford, Chief Executive Officer,
Granite House, Derry, NH; New Freedom Academy, Canterbury, NH), 2015
WL 8158091.
See, e.g., OpioidAbuse Among Older Americans, supra note 43.
The term left-over prescriptionsrefers to instances in which the patient does not
use the entire amount prescribed and thus some prescription pills are "left
over." See, e.g., Opioid Crisis: Field HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 61-69 (2016) (prepared statement of
Tim Westlake, M.D., Vice Chairman, State of Wisconsin Medical Examining
Board and Chairman, Controlled Substances Committee) [hereinafter Heroin
and Prescriptionopioids in Wisconsin], 2016 WL 1572172.
See, e.g., DEA 2016, supra note 47.
See, e.g., Opioid Abuse Among Older Americans, supra note 43.
Blaming the "bad apples" is a common causal narrative strategy. See STONE,
supra note 5, at 208-11.
See, e.g., Heroin and Prescriptionopioids in Wisconsin, supra note 50, at 64.
See, e.g., Examining the Opioid Epidemic: Challengesand Opportunities:HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 42 (2016) (prepared statement of David
Hart, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Health Fraud Unit/Consumer Protection
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For example, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the DEA
argued:
Another factor that contributes to the increase of
prescription drug diversion is the availability of these
drugs in the household. In many cases, dispensed
controlled substances remain in household medicine
cabinets well after medication therapy has been
completed, thus providing easy access to non-medical
users, accidental ingestion, or illegal distribution for
profit."
By referring to the availability of prescription pain pills in
the household, the DEA could reference the consequences of overprescription (left-over prescriptions) as the cause of the problem,
without discussing the prescribers' acts of over-prescribing.
Criminal justice agencies, like the DEA, also blamed the "bad
apples" in the medical industry directly, for intentionally diverting
and profiting from the diversions. 7 Blaming the bad apples has its
political advantages because it allows the blamed group to claim
that it is not the group as a whole that is "bad," but rather, a few
bad seeds that can be weeded out." It signals to prescribers that
their competence and character were not at issue and assuaged

56

57
58

Section, Oregon Department of Justice), 2016 WL 706631 ("Oregon, like the
rest of the nation, has continued to struggle with overprescribing and misuse
of prescription opioids."). In some cases, the speaker spoke of how PDMPs
decreased the availability of prescription opioids and overdoses. See, e.g.,
Heroin/PrescriptionDrug Abuse: HearingBefore the S Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2016) (statement of Nora D. Volkow, M.D., Director, National Institute
on Drug Abuse), 2016 WL 319843. These cases focused on the solution of
curbing over-prescription rather than the cause of over-prescription itself.
See, e.g., id.; Opioid Crisis:Field HearingBefore the Comm. on S. Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 151-156 (2016) (prepared statement of
Carole S. Rendon, Acting U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Ohio, United
States Attorney's Office, U.S. Department ofJustice), 2016 WL 1608495.
Controlled Substances Quota Process: Hearing Before the Caucus on Int'l Narcotics
Control of the S. Comm'ns. and Temp. Comms., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement
of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement Administration) [hereinafter DEA 2015], 2015
WL 1643509.
See, e.g., id.
See STONE, supranote 5, at 206-28, for a general discussion about the uses of
the "bad apple" narrative in the policy process.
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any fears that prescribers, as a group, would be punished for the
actions of outliers. Further, supporting such a narrative justified the
involvement of criminal justice agencies like Department of Justice
and the DEA 9 and enabled them to request funding to support their
role in addressing the opioid crisis.6 0 With the decrease in support
for criminal justice solutions to addressing drug problems, agencies
like the DEA must continue to justify their expenditures and budget
requests. Going along with the health framing, but insisting that
there are still "bad guys" within the medical industry causing the
problem at issue, allows agencies like the DEA to carve out a role
as a "fixer" of the problem and in doing so ensure their continued
relevance."1
Since medical professionals, particularly physicians'
groups and nurses' associations, are generally positively socially
constructed6 2 and relatively politically powerful,6 3 it is not surprising
that some pressure groups did not expressly blame prescribers
directly for causing the crisis. These groups focused instead on
suggesting solutions, including PDMPs and promulgating physician
guidelines, both of which were described as tools that could be used
to help practitioners do their jobs better,14 as opposed to punishment
59
60

61

62

See DEA 2015, supranote 56.
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, FACT SHEET: President Obama
Proposes $1.1 Billion in New Funding to Address the PrescriptionOpioid Abuse and
Heroin Use Epidemic (Feb. 2, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2016/02/02/president-obama-proposes-1 1-billion-newfunding-address-prescription.
For a more detailed accounting of the changing narratives of criminal justice
actors in response to the opioid crisis, see Taleed El-Sabawi, Carrots, Sticks and
ProblemDrug Use: The Law Enforcement Lobby's Contributionto the Policy Discourse
on Drug Use & the opioid Crisis, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
Individual actors are organized by society into groups. See ANNE LARASON
SCHNEIDER

63
64

&

HELEN

INGRAM,

POLICY

DESIGN

FOR

DEMOCRACY

107-09 (1997). These groups are ascribed certain characteristics, often
resulting in the group as being either negatively or positively construed. Id.
These constructions do more than determine the social value of members of
the groups, but also have political consequences in the policymaking process.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., VA Opioid PrescriptionPolicy, Practice and Procedures: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Veterans'Affairs, 114th Cong. 6-10 (2015) (prepared statement of
Carolyn Clancy, M.D., Interim Under Secretary for Health, Veterans Health
Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) [hereinafter Clancy,
VA Opioid PrescriptionPolicy] (Veterans Administration's explanation of the
benefits of a PDMP), 2015 WL 1348882.
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for misdeeds.
Some narratives did directly blame prescribers as a group for
over-prescribing. 6 s Oftentimes, those most critical of the medical
profession came from within it. For example, two physician testifiers,
one representing the Wisconsin Medical Board, and the other
representing the Phoenix House, a well-known treatment facility,
blamed prescribers for causing the opioid crisis,6 6 but communicated
prescribers' good intentions and lack of malice, emphasizing that
they had meant to help, not harm.6 7 They argued that although
their actions may have been intentional (prescribing opioids), the
consequences of their actions (addiction, overdoses, and diversion)
were unintended.
Aside from deflecting blame by arguing that the consequences
of their acts were unintended, prescribers tried to shift blame by
using (1) narratives that argued that "bad apples" were responsible
for over-prescribing and diversion, (2) narratives that attempted to
shift the focus to another point in the causal chain, and (3) narratives
that blamed the system's emphasis on treating pain for all patients
seeking care.
For example, some physicians that testified embraced the
bad apple strategy in order to deflect blame from the profession as
a whole." Such a causal narrative strategy allowed the profession
as a group to shift the blame to the greedy and malicious doctor
65

66

67

68

See Examining the True Costs of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Native Communities:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015), 18-22
(prepared statement of Hon. Melanie Benjamin, Chief Executive, Mille Lacs
Band of Ojibwe Indians) [hereinafter Drug Abuse in Native Communities], 2015
WL 4572873; Heroin and Prescriptionopioids in Wisconsin, supra note 50; Opioid
Use Among Seniors: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 114th Cong.
(2016) (statement of Jerome Adams, M.D., MPH, Commissioner, Indiana
State Department of Health), 2016 WL 739340.
Heroin and PrescriptionOpioids in Wisconsin, supra note 50; Heroin and Prescription
Drug Abuse: HearingBefore the Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control of the S. Comm'ns.
and Temp. Comms., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Andrew Kolodny, M.D.,
Chief Medical Officer, Phoenix House Foundation) [hereinafter Statement
of Kolodny], 2014 WL 1990484. See, e.g., Heroin and Prescription Opioids in
Wisconsin, supra note 50, at 62 ("To speak frankly, there can be no doubt
that the sources of the supply of opioids stem from the ease of availability
of prescription opioids due to over-prescription by doctors themselves. We
physicians need to own our part in the problem.").
See, e.g., Statement of Kolodny, supra note 66, at *2 ("Doctors didn't start
overprescribing opioids out of malicious intent. For most of us it was a desire
to treat pain more compassionately that led to overprescribing.").
See, e.g., Heroin and Prescriptionopioids in Wisconsin, supra note 50.
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dealers, the "bad guys." Blame was also shifted from physicians to
"doctor shoppers,""9 persons who went from doctor to doctor drugseeking. Although doctor shoppers may have been individuals with
opioid use disorder that were drug-seeking, the DEA frequently
characterized "doctor shoppers" as part of pharmaceutical diversion
schemes, grouping them with the likes of "prescription forgery rings,
and practitioners and pharmacists who knowingly divert controlled
substance pharmaceuticals."" Persons with opioid use disorders that
were seeking opioids were more often referred to as drug seekers,
and although drug seekers were also blamed for "doctor shopping,"
they were not portrayed as the "bad guys." They were described
more so as persons who needed to be identified and offered help.
They were portrayed as persons who were ill and needed treatment
as opposed to "bad apples."7 1

Another narrative strategy used to deflect blame away
from prescribers was to redirect focus to another point in the
causal chain. For example, some prescribers argued that opioid
pain pill manufacturers, like Purdue, misrepresented the safety
of their products. 72 Prescribers argued that they relied on the
misrepresentations provided to them by companies like Purdue
when deciding how to treat patients with chronic pain. 73 The Food
and Drug Administration was also blamed for allowing companies
like Purdue to market their drugs for chronic pain, despite the lack
of evidence for its efficacy.74
69

70
71

72

73
74

See, e.g., America's Heroin and opioidAbuse Epidemic: HearingBefore the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 114th Cong. 24-34 (2016) (written statement of
Louis J. Milione, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control,
Drug Enforcement Administration), 2016 WL 1106485.
Id. at 28, 30.
See, e.g., DEA 2016, supra note 46. Even the DEA refrained from portraying
drug users as criminals, opting to refer to them instead as "our family
members, friends, neighbors, and colleagues." Id. at *1.
See Examining Heroin and OpiateAbuse in Southwestern Pennsylvania:HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Health Care of the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 39-41 (2015)
(prepared statement of A. Jack Kabazie, M.D., System Director, Division
of Pain Medicine, Allegheny Health Network) [hereinafter Opiate Abuse in
Southwestern Pennsylvania], 2015 WL 5999232; Statement of Kolodny, supra
note 66.
See, e.g., Statement of Kolodny, supra note 66.
One narrator blamed not only Purdue Pharma but also the FDA's improper
enforcement of "the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) in
1996, when Purdue Pharma released OxyContin. The FD&C Act prohibits
drug companies from promoting products for conditions where evidence of
safety and efficacy is lacking. Instead of enforcing the FD&C Act, FDA allowed

390

El-Sabawi

Finally, prescribers blamed the system as a whole for
pressuring them to address pain at every visit by treating pain as the
fifth vital sign.75 This emphasis was institutionalized with systemwide quality measures that tied physicians' performance ratings
with patient reports of whether or not their pain was adequately
addressed.76 Further, this emphasis persisted despite the lack of
tools, aside from prescription opioids, available to prescribers to
address pain.
b. Demand-Side Causal Stories
In the 2014-2016 legislative discourse analyzed, demandside causal stories, or causal stories that attributed the cause of the
opioid crisis to users' demand for drugs, focused on the lack of access
to treatment and the biological mechanisms of addiction. The idea
that socio-economic, psychological, or sociological circumstances
caused or even contributed to the opioid crisis was largely lacking
from the congressional hearing testimony. Despite recent and past
research that acknowledges the roles of depression,7 joblessness, 79

75

76

77

78
79

Purdue Pharma to promote OxyContin to family doctors for treatment
of common aches and pains and to launch a campaign ofmisinformation about
opioid risks and benefits." Id. at *3.
See, e.g., Daigh, VA Opioid PrescriptionPolicy, supra note 47, at 12 ("Adequate
management of pain has become a tenant of the compassionate delivery of
health care. Subjective pain levels are now considered to be the fifth vital sign
in medicine in addition to body temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate, and
blood pressure.").
See, e.g., Opiate Abuse in Southwestern Pennsylvania, supra note 72, at 39-40
("Physicians who have compensation or employment tied to patient
satisfaction scores may feel pressure to prescribe opioids in response to
patient pain complaints.").
See, e.g., Addressing Trauma and Mental Health Challenges in Indian Country: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. 30-35 (2016) (prepared
statement of Kathryn R. Eagle-Williams, M.D., CEO/Quality Care Director,
Elbowoods Memorial Health Center, Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation),
2016 WL 4527182 (discussing the lack of tools to address mental health
issues in Native American communities, including the use of opiates "to mask
mental illness.").
See Katherine McLean, "There's Nothing Here": Deindustrialization as Risk
Environmentfor Overdose, 29 INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 19, 24-25 (2016).
Id. at 24.
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lack of social connectedness,so neighborhood sociocultural factors,"1
and lack of hope (for the betterment of life's circumstances)8 2 in
influencing addiction and overdose, reference to such causes was
largely ignored in the 2014-2016 hearing testimony.
The narratives that cited the lack of access to treatment as
a cause of the opioid crisis were often ambiguous. Most implied
that access to treatment was a problem without referring to the lack
of treatment as a cause of the opioid crisis, but rather proposing
solutions that include expanding funding provided to treatment
systems.83 These narratives generally called for an increase in
funding.14

Another subset of narratives cited the lack of "evidencebased" or "quality" treatment as a problem contributing to the opioid
crisis. These narratives were frequently coupled with solutions
proposing increased access to medication assisted treatment
(MAT)."s In other words, there seemed to be a common association
of MAT with evidence-based or quality treatment. Not all MAT was
treated equally, with some narrators supporting certain types of MAT
over others." Many of these narrators were careful to acknowledge
80

See generally Amary Mey et al., What's the Attraction? Social Connectedness as a
Driver of RecreationalDrug Use, 23 J. SUBSTANCE USE 327 (2018); Theophile
Niyonsenga et al., Social Support, Attachment, and Chronic Stress as Correlates of
Latina Mother and Daughter Drug Use Behaviors, 21 AM. J. ADDICTIONS 157
(2012); John Oetzel et al., Social Support and Social Undermining as Correlatesfor
Alcohol, Drug, and MentalDisordersin American Indian Women Presentingfor Primary
Care at an Indian Health Service Hospital, 12 J. HEALTH COMM. 187 (2007).

81

COMM. ON OPPORTUNITIES IN DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH, INST. OF MED.,
PATHWAYS OF ADDICTION: OPPORTUNITIES IN DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH

82
83

84

85
86

126-27 (1996) (discussing sociocultural and environmental factors in certain
communities that affect drug use and abuse).
See generally HART, supra note 30.
See, e.g., opioid Abuse Among Older Americans, supra note 43; Heroin/Prescription
Drug Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016)
(statement of Linda E. Hurley, Chief Operating Officer and Director, Clinical
Services, CODAC Behavioral Healthcare, Inc.), 2016 WL 319842.
See, e.g., America's Growing Heroin Epidemic: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 114th
Cong. 60-68, 64 (2015) (preparedstatementofNancyG. Parr, Commonwealth's
Attorney, City of Chesapeake, Va.) 2015 WL 4538567 ("There are too few
treatment programs. There are too few affordable treatment programs.
There is insufficient funding for valid treatment programs. There is a stigma
related to seeking treatment. Money addresses the first three problems and
education can address the fourth.").
See, e.g., NIDA 2014, supra note 41.
Some groups voiced concern over the addictiveness of methadone, the
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that MAT could and should be combined with psychotherapeutic
treatment and that MAT was not for everyone. 7 However, the need
to expand the number of treatment providers that were legally able
to provide MAT was frequently mentioned."8
Although overdose reversal medications (ORMs) do not
technically reduce the demand for drugs, I considered any narrative
referencing the lack of access to ORMs as demand causal narratives,
because ORMs are harm-reduction methods that are meant to be
followed up with treatment for the underlying substance abuse."
Lack of access to ORMs was not necessarily cited as a major cause
of the opioid crisis; however, lack of access to ORMs was cited as a
factor that contributed to the scope of the problem. 0 Further, even
if the causal narratives used did not cite to a lack of access to ORMs
as the dominant cause, many referred to increasing access to ORMs

87
88

89

90

potential for its abuse, and the possibility of diversion. See, e.g., Drug Abuse in
Native Communities, supra note 65.
See, e.g., NIDA 2014, supra note 41.
See, e.g., opioid Abuse Among Older Americans, supra note 43; Opioid Abuse in
America: Facing the Epidemic and Examining Solutions: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 114th Cong. 8-15 (2015) (prepared
statement of Leana Wen, M.D., Health Department Commissioner, Baltimore,
MD), 2015 WL 8489722; Statement of Kolodny, supra note 66.
Naloxonefor Opioid Overdose: Life-Saving Science, NAT' L INST. FO R DRUG ABUS E,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/naloxone-opioid-overdose-lifesaving-science/naloxone-opioid-overdose-life-saving-science
(last updated
Mar. 2017).
See, e.g., Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriationsfor 2016, Part 6: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Dep'ts
of Labor, Health and Human Servs., Educ., and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 114th Cong. 568-72 (2016) (prepared statement of Whitney
O'Neill Englander, Government Relations Manager, Harm Reduction
Coalition), 2015 WL 1967922; Examining the Growing Problems of Prescription
Drug and Heroin Abuse: State and Local Perspectives: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigationsof the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong.
15-24 (2015) (prepared statement of Fred Wells Brason, II, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Project Lazarus), 2015 WL 1384265; Examining the
True Costs of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Native Communities: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. 11-16 (2015) (prepared statement of
Mirtha Beadle, Director, Office of Tribal Affairs and Policy Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services), 2015 WL 4572876; What Is the Federal Government Doing to
Combat the Opioid Abuse Epidemic?: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on oversight and
Investigationsof the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 58-70 (2015)
(prepared statement of Douglas C. Throckmorton, M.D., Deputy Director,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration),
2015 WL 1967893.

VOL. 11, No. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

393

when proposing solutions to the problem."1
Finally, some causal stories did mention the lack of patient
education as a contributing factor to the opioid crisis or referenced
the need to educate patients on the risks of opioid prescriptions in
an effort to decrease their demand for the drugs.9 2
B. Summary of Findings
While CARA evidenced a rare instance in U.S. drug policy in
which health solutions dominated legislation, the causal narratives
used and the solutions adopted appeared more of a departure from
the U.S.'s past approaches to drug policy than they actually were. The
types of causal stories used by pressure groups in hearing testimony
equally favored supply-side causal theories and ambiguous calls for
increasing the access to treatment; the solutions offered focused on
decreasing the supply of opioids, most often through reducing the
prescription of opioids overall via prescriber education and PDMPs.
Although health actors may have been called to implement the
proposals and health-related terminology may have been used, at
their core, these solutions are supply-side solutions. The actors in
the causal stories were different but the storylines remained similar.
The drug dealers of the 1980s and 1990s were changed to physicians
91

92

See, e.g., Clancy, VA Opioid PrescriptionPolicy, supra note 64; Drug Enforcement
Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec.,
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12-18 (2014)
(prepared statement of Hon. Michele M. Leonhart, Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration), 2014 WL 4643550; Examining the Policies and
Prioritiesof the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: HearingBefore the
H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 114th Cong. 12-28 (2016) (prepared
statement of Hon. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services), 2016 WL 1023258. Increasing access to ORMs
included training or calling for the training of first responders to administer
ORMs. See, e.g., Border Security-2015, Volume 2 of 2: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs, 114th Cong. 1568-1578 (2015) (prepared
statement of Hon. R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), 2015 WL 5317597;
Deadly Synthetic Drugs and Poison Peddlers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Sullivan K. Smith, MD, FACEP,
Medical Director, Emergency Department Cookeville Regional Medical
Center, Cookeville, Tenn.), 2016 WL 3165409.
See, e.g., VA Accountability: Assessing Actions Taken in Response to subcommittee
Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, 113th Cong. 33-39 (2014) (prepared statement of Robert Petzel,
M.D., Under Secretary for Health, Veterans Health Administration, U.S.
Department of Veterans' Affairs), 2014 WL 768554.

394

EI-Sabawi

or prescribers. Prescription drug companies and pill mills were
substituted in for the international drug cartels.93 There appeared
to be a general consensus that it was the availability of opioids that
caused the nation's drug problems-the underlying assumption that
the mere availability of psychoactive substances would create a new
class of drug users.
Although the focus of the narratives and the aligning
solutions were supply-oriented, and not evidence of a demandside focus found in more progressive drug policy, these supply-side
solutions were not the same criminal justice-oriented solutions
of the past." And such a shift is at least a symbolic victory, as it
evidences an understanding that the U.S.'s historic approach is not
effective. However, the types of causal stories used to describe the
opioid crisis and aligned solutions are piecemeal at best, superficial
at worst, and only bring the U.S. marginally closer to embracing the
most evidence-based drug policy regimes.
Moreover, the discourse focused more so on which policy
solutions to enact, as opposed to fully engaging in a discussion
of what caused the opioid crisis in the first place. In much of the
testimony, it was accepted as a given that over-prescription caused
the opioid crisis and, as such, over-prescription needed to be
curtailed. While the need to cut down on opioid prescriptions and
to simultaneously better fund substance abuse treatment centers are
worthwhile endeavors, unless the U.S. fully engages in a discussion
of what causes a person to misuse prescription pain medication or
illicit drugs, the billions of dollars of funding allocated to addressing
the opioid crisis will not produce the desired results, nor will they
have any lasting effect on stymieing future drug crises.
Had their motivation been collectively to redefine problem
drug use in a manner most aligned with best practices in drug policy,
pressure groups might have focused on demand-side approaches
that emphasize a public health orientation, or even better yet, an
emphasis on improving the well-being of the drug user so that he is
less likely to use.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
In this article, I have reviewed the ways in which pressure
93

94

See, e.g., DEA 2016, supra note 46, at *3. Mexican cartels were also referenced
as contributors to the opioid crisis, but the cartels were blamed far less
frequently than health actors. See, e.g., id.
El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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groups can use causal stories to influence the types of policy
solutions available to legislators seeking to address the policy
problem, specifically the current opioid crisis. To lend credence to
the theoretical literature cited, I analyzed congressional hearing
testimony given by pressure groups testifying on problem drug use
prior to the passage of CARA, health-oriented federal legislation
aimed at addressing the drug crisis. Since the types of causal theories
used to describe a policy problem are posited to align with the types
of solutions adopted, I expected to see health-oriented causal stories
dominating the criminal justice-oriented causal stories commonly
used to justify past U.S. drug policy."
Pressure groups did indeed utilize a health-oriented approach
to characterize the opioid crisis. The causal stories used painted the
issue as one that was caused by health actors and one that should
be solved using the health system. The transition from a criminal
justice orientation to a health orientation shifted the blame from
the drug user's character to forces outside of the user's control,
like outside actors and biological predispositions. In doing so, the
hearing testimony often portrayed drug users as persons in need of
medical help as opposed to criminal punishment. This shift away
from what European scholars have termed the "moral paradigm"
approach and toward an assistentialism approach is laudable, as it
makes treatment more likely than incarceration."
Such a framing, however, remains decades behind our
European counterparts who have surpassed the assistentialism
approach to embrace a public health approach and have progressed
beyond the public health approach to advocate for a well-being
approach. 7 Preceding CARA's enactment, the bipartisan support
for addressing problem drug use and the more positive social
construction of the target population of drug users" offered
95
96

97
98

See generally id. (providing overview of some of these criminal justice oriented
causal stories and policies).
The "moral paradigm" approach was influenced by puritan ideology; the
dominant causal narrative attributed addiction to the individual's lack of selfcontrol and overall character weakness, and drug users were characterized as
"sinful" and "vicious." See YSA ET AL., supranote 9, at 3-4. The assistentialism
approach is characterized by a belief that drug users are in need of saving and
that the healthcare professional is the individual best suited for doing the
saving; the dominant causal narrative attributed addiction to disease. See id. at
4.
See ALICE RAP FINDINGS, supra note 13, at #4, 8, 42, 45, 48, 49.
See Taleed El-Sabawi, What Motivates Legislators to Act: Problem Definition & the
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advocates a policy window of opportunity" for which drug policy
advocates could redefine problem drug use. Such an opportunity to
re-characterize a policy problem is rare and the manner in which
pressure groups choose to do so affects not only the current opioid
crisis, but also has long-lasting effects on the path of drug policy in
the future. 100
Rather than take full advantage of this opportunity to recharacterize problem drug use in a way that aligned with best
practices in drug policy, actors testifying before Congress were
focused on the immediate need to decrease the availability of opioids,
attributing the cause of the problem to the supply of opioids and
proposing solutions to help decrease the supply. Given the over-use
of prescription opioids in the last decade, it is not surprising that
over-prescription was often cited as the main cause of the opioid
crisis and that it was regularly accompanied by solutions aimed
at decreasing the number of prescriptions. Despite the short-term
benefits of supply control, as a long-term focus of drug policy, supply
control-oriented drug policy, as opposed to demand control, is not
a feature of the leading European drug policy model 01 and has not
been successful in controlling drug use in the U.S. historically. 102
Admittedly, some pressure groups involved in the causal
narrative discourse may have been most interested in supporting
narratives that protected its members from blame and punishment,
as opposed to strategically utilizing this window of opportunity to
decrease problem drug use in the long term. However, even drug
policy and health advocates that were concerned primarily with
improving the rates of addiction and overdose did not take advantage
of the opportunity to redefine drug use in a manner that made most
likely the adoption of a drug policy system that would deliver the best
Opioid Epidemic, a Case Study, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 188, 211-12 (2018)
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(discussing the social construction of target populations in general and as
applied to populations of drug users throughout history).
See supra text accompanying note 16.
See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY
CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY

101
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(2009) (providing an analysis

of group efforts to define policy issues and noting the rarity of successful
problem re-definition).
YSA ET AL., supra note 9, at 47-48. None of the trendsetting countries in drug
policy prioritize supply reduction, whether it be through efforts to arrest and
penalize high traffic offenders, prevent the importation of drugs, or to monitor
drug diversion from pharmacies and physicians. See id. at 47-68.
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 23, at 132, 159-60.
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long-term results.
Although cloaked in medical and health terminology, many
of the causal stories used by pressure groups emphasized the supply,
or availability, of prescription opioids as the cause of the crisis and
substituted actors in the medical industry for the street drug dealers
of past narratives. Despite references to biological or genetic factors
or lack of access to health services, the psychological, sociological,
economic, and health factors that greatly impact drug use103 were
essentially ignored. Of course, greater funding for drug treatment is
greatly needed, as is the expansion of access to MAT, two solutions
that were identified by pressure groups. However, without building
the structure that is found in model drug policy systems and without
establishing coordination between agencies that address not only
treatment but also the triggers and social determinants of drug use,
the money allocated to address the opioid crisis will not address the
root causes of problem drug use.
Undeniably, the U.S. does not have the social safety net that is
the hallmark of many European countries with model drug policies.
For example, many of the countries with the best drug policies also
have universal healthcare systems, as well as more generous welfare
systems. 104 Therefore, some may argue that European countries had
the infrastructure and the policy experience to approach drug use
as a public health problem or a well-being problem. Even conceding
these claims, however, the U.S. does have a shadow or privatized
welfare state 1 s that it can draw on and private actors within it that it
can coordinate with in order to mimic European drug policy without
overhauling its social welfare system. Aside from coordinating with
the private sector, U.S. policymakers could work with state and local
103 See Laura Stoll & Peter Anderson, Well-being as a Frameworkfor Understanding
Addictive Substances, in THE IMPACT OF ADDICTIVE SUBSTANCES AND
BEHAVIOURS ON INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL WELL-BEING 53, 58-64
(Peter Anderson et al. eds., 2015) (discussing the link between factors that
comprise a person's well-being and various addictions). See generally Robert C.
Pope et al., The Social Determinants of Substance Abuse in African American Baby
Boomers:Effects ofFamily, Media Images, and Environment, 21 J. TRANSCULTURAL
NU RS I NG 246 (2010). See also Petra Meier et al., Project Area 3: Determinants
of Addiction, ALICE RAP http://www.alicerap.eu/about-alice-rap/areas-aworkpackages/area-3-determinants-of-addiction.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2018).
104 See generally YSA ET AL., supranote 9.
105 See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR,
BUSINESS, AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES

1-2 (2000).
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governments, as well as with existing federal programs, to offer
coordinated services and rehabilitation programs for drug users or
persons at risk for drug use. Federal funding to address the opioid
crisis can be allocated not only to fund treatment, but also to assist
with housing, job training, and trauma treatment, thereby increasing
drug users' quality of life and decreasing their demand for drugs.
However, without framing drug use as a problem caused
by demand-as a problem which is rooted in psychological, social,
economic, and behavioral factors-the wrap-around solutions
needed to treat and prevent drug use are not even on the table for
discussion. Such a holistic causal definition is necessary to make
policy alternatives available that embrace multimodal policies,
involving the medical, public health, social services, criminal
justice, housing sector, rehabilitation services, and job training and
reintegration programs that are key features of trendsetting drug
policy models adopted in other developed countries. These policy
frameworks not only address current drug crises but also prevent
future crises by ensuring a continuum of care that extends beyond
the walls of traditional treatment and confinement-progressing to
the adoption of what European scholars have called the "well-being
paradigm," whose end outcome is to improve drug users' wellbeing. 106
Pressure groups that have the time and attention of
legislators looking to adopt a problem definition for the opioid crisis
are in prime positions to popularize such demand causal stories.
And, although it is common for scholars and concerned citizens
to consider organized interests as corrupt players in politics, they
offer both groups access to the problem definition process. After all,
organized interests include professional organizations and citizens'
groups, groups that are open to legal scholars and concerned citizens
alike to join, to participate in, and to influence.
In conclusion, pressure groups' adoption of a health approach
to defining the opioid crisis was notable, but far from the redefinition
needed to effectuate true drug policy reform. If policy actors are
interested in both addressing current drug misuse and preventing
future increases in misuse and overdose deaths, the causal stories
that they use to describe the cause of drug use must be more than
106 ALICE RAP
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superficially health-oriented. Concerned actors must dig deeper and
ask not only why is there an increase in the drug supply, but ask
instead, why is there an increase in demand for drugs? Dr. Andrew
Weil provides a thought-provoking answer to this question that can
challenge the dominant causal theories used to explain the opioid
crisis. He writes,
To come up with a valid explanation, we simply must
suspend our value judgments about kinds of drugs
and admit (however painful it might be) that the glass
of beer on a hot afternoon and the bottle of wine with
a fine meal are no different in kind from the joint of
marijuana or the snort of cocaine; nor is the evening
devoted to cocktails essentially different from the day
devoted to mescaline. All are examples of the same
phenomenon: the use of chemical agents to induce
alterations in consciousness. 10 7
He goes on to theorize that people use drugs because they
wish to change their consciousness, and their inner need to change
consciousness is mostly unaffected by whether or not the drugs are
legal.10 If Dr. Weil is correct and people do demand and use drugs
to alter their consciousness-if the need and desire to alter one's
consciousness is so deep that legality of the drug is inconsequentialthen maybe rather than focusing on decreasing the supply of drugs,
drug policy advocates are best advised to ask why chronic and longterm drug users feel such an overwhelming desire to alter their
consciousness, or put another way, to escape their reality. Do they
have an underlying and untreated mental health issue for which drug
use provides relief? Are their living circumstances so abysmal that
a drug-induced state is their best escape? Or, are they genetically
predisposed to addiction or have underlying altered brain structure
from use? These questions are by no means exhaustive and do not
address all of the potential causes for a user's demand for a drug.
However, asking such questions leads us to identifying causes that
align with policy proposals that can change the path of drug policy
from a supply orientation to a demand orientation. Pressure groups'
107 Andrew Weil, Why People Take Drugs, in THE AMERICAN DRUG SCENE:
READINGS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 72-80, 73 (James A. Inciardi & Karen
McElrath eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 7th ed. 2015) (1972).
108 Id. at 73-74, 80.
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use of a health-oriented frame is a step in the right direction, as long
as we acknowledge that it is a small step, and move forward with the
intent of taking advantage of future windows of political opportunity
to advance not only a health frame but a public health frame, or even
a well-being frame, that places the demand of the user at the heart
of its narrative.
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